ABSTRACT As the further extension of the multi-receiver signcryption, the multi-message and multireceiver signcryption allows a sender to simultaneously signcrypt different messages for different receivers in only one logic operation, which makes it more flexible than the traditional multi-receiver signcryption in which only the same and unique message can be sent to all authorized receivers. The existing multimessage and multi-receiver signcryption schemes are constructed based on either the identity-based cryptography or the public key infrastructure-based cryptography, and thus, they have to suffer from the key escrow problem inherent in the identity-based cryptography or the public key certificate management burden related with the public key infrastructure-based cryptography. Certificateless public key cryptography provides an idea to solve the key escrow problem and eliminate the public key certificate management burden and has been applied to many cryptographic algorithms. In this paper, to avoid the above problems in the existing multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption schemes, the concept of the certificateless public key cryptography was introduced into the designing of the multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption, and a certificateless multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption scheme was proposed. The proposed scheme is free from the key escrow problem and the public key certificate management burden because it is constructed based on the certificateless public key cryptography. Moreover, compared with the existing schemes, it is improved in efficiency because it does not use the bilinear pairing operations but utilizes the limited number of scalar point multiplication on elliptic curve cryptography operations. At the same time, the proposed scheme achieves receiver anonymity.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of the Internet and communication technologies, multicast services have become more and more popular in our daily life, such as mobile crowdsensing [1] and cloud computing [2] , [3] . Multi-receiver encryption/ signcryption [4] , widely considered as one of most promising and efficient solutions to one-to-many secure communication, enables the sender to securely send the same message
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Zhitao Guan. to multiple receivers synchronously by only one logic operation, and only authorized receivers can decrypt the message independently while others cannot. Multi-receiver encryption/signcryption has been applied to paid-TV system [5] , IOT [6] and smart grid [7] .
However, in recent years, the multicast communication environment in reality has become more and more complex [8] . In a practical application environment, it often happens that different services need to be provided to different customers, and in this case, the multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption [9] , as the further extension of the multi-receiver signcryption [10] , comes into being. In a multi-receiver signcryption scheme, the sender is enabled to send the unique and same message to all authorized receivers, while in a multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption scheme, the sender is enabled to send multiple and different messages to different receivers in one logic operation, and each authorized receiver can designcrypt out his/her own plaintext message without exposing the plaintext messages of others. Nowadays, the research on the multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption has become a new hotspot in the field of information security. In this paper, our attention is mainly paid to the multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption scheme, and thus in the following, we shall mainly describe its motivation, development and shortcomings.
The idea of the multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption was firstly presented by Seo and Kim [9] . Seo and Kim proposed a domain-verifiable multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption scheme which is applied to the electronic funds transfer protocol, and in their scheme, each predetermined participant could decrypt out his/her own corresponding plaintext message and verify the whole transaction within the domain. Later, Dalia [11] proposed a chaotic public key multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption scheme. In Dalia's scheme, the strength and security of the algorithm is increased by designing the chaotic multi-key generator to generate chaotic keys for both the block cipher and keyed hash algorithms. Unfortunately, in Dalia's scheme, each authorized receiver not only could obtain his/her own plaintext message by decrypting the ciphertext, but also could obtain other authorized receivers' plaintext messages, which is not what the multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption wants. In 2008, Hassan and Esam [12] proposed a new multimessage and multi-receiver signcryption scheme. Hassan and Esam's scheme [12] is designed based on the elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [13] and is reduced in the computation cost, but it has the same problem as Dalia's scheme [11] , that is, it enables the authorized receiver to obtain other authorized receivers' plaintext messages.
To ensure the security of the group communication, Han and Gui [14] proposed a novel multi-message and multireceiver signcryption scheme. Different from Dalia's scheme and Hassan and Esam's scheme, Han and Gui's scheme restricts the ability of the authorized receiver, which enables each authorized receiver to obtain only his/her own plaintext message by decrypting the ciphertext without exposing others' plaintext messages. Soon afterwards, based on the designing idea similar to their previous scheme, Han et al. proposed two other multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption schemes [15] , [16] . Han et al.'s first scheme [15] provides an adaptive secure multicast framework based on the multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption in wireless networks, and their another scheme [16] provides a method to reduce multicast networks computational overheads by the parallel algorithm. Although Han et al.' s schemes [14] - [16] meet the requirements of the multi-message and multireceiver signcryption, they all use the time-consuming operations such as the bilinear pairing operations or the modular exponentiation operations [17] , and thus they are low in efficiency.
In 2013, Kumar and Ansari [18] proposed a multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption based on the chaos with public verifiability. In Kumar and Ansari's scheme, the public verifiability [19] is achieved, which means that any thirdparty can verify whether the ciphertext is valid or not without the knowledge of the sender's or receiver's private key, and at the same time, the use of the chaos makes the security of their algorithm enhanced. Unfortunately, Kumar et al.' s scheme is as inefficient as Han et al. ' s schemes due to the fact that it also utilizes modular exponentiation operations. In 2015, Nizamud Din et al. [20] proposed an efficient multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption scheme. Nizamud Din et al.'s scheme is constructed based on scalar point multiplication on ECC operations instead of the complex bilinear pairing operations, and it is improved in efficiency largely. Also for the improvement on the computation efficiency, Rahman et al. [21] proposed a lightweight multimessage and multi-receiver signcryption scheme in 2018. Rahman et al. improve the efficiency of their scheme by using divisor multiplication on hyper elliptic curve operations, and analyses show that their scheme is more efficient than Nizamud et al.'s scheme.
Nevertheless, it worth noting that the existing multimessage and multi-receiver signcryption schemes [9] , [11] , [12] , [14] - [16] , [18] , [20] , [21] mentioned above are mainly constructed based on the public key infrastructure (PKI)-based cryptography [22] , which means that they should suffer from the public key certificate management burden related with the PKI-based cryptography and need an expensive cost to maintain PKI for application systems, which is not practical for small-scale and temporary applications. To avoid the public key certificate management burden, Qiu et al. [23] proposed an identity-based multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption scheme in 2016. In Qiu et al.'s scheme, identitybased cryptography (IBC) [24] , in which the user's public key is related to his/her own identity and maintaining PKI is not required, is introduced into the designing of the multimessage and multi-receiver signcryption scheme so as to avoid its public key certificate management burden. Subsequently, Wang et al. [25] proposed another multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption scheme for ad-hoc networks. Their scheme makes use of the heterogeneous system to shift between the PKI-based cryptography and IBC, and thus it achieves two-way signcryption.
Regretfully, in Wang et al.'s scheme and Qiu et al.'s scheme, the utilization of IBC causes the inevitable key escrow problem [26] related with IBC, that is to say, the user's complete private key can be obtained by key generation center (KGC) and malicious KGC attacks cannot be prevented. In 2017, Niu et al. proposed two heterogeneous multimessage and multi-receiver signcryption schemes [27] , [28] , successively. Niu et al.'s first scheme [27] can shift from certificateless public key cryptography (CLC-PKC) [29] to IBC, and their another scheme [28] can shift from IBC to CLC-PKC. Niu et al. ' s two schemes all use CLC-PKC [29] , in which the key escrow problem in IBC is solved because the user' private key is generated by the user and KGC and it cannot be obtained by KGC, and at the same time the public key certificate management burden in the PKI-based cryptography is non-existent as a result of the inheritance of IBC's advantage. Unfortunately, both of their two schemes still suffer from the key escrow problem, which results from the fact that their schemes applied IBC. Moreover, it is worth noting that multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption schemes [23] , [25] , [27] , [28] employ the time-consuming bilinear pairing operations, which makes them low in efficiency.
As we know, the receiver anonymity [30] is a very important security attribute in multi-receiver encryption/ signcryption, and thus, when we design the multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption scheme, known as a branch of the multi-receiver signcryption scheme, the receiver anonymity should also be taken into consideration. The receiver anonymity [31] means that each user can judge that whether he/she is an authorized receiver or not but cannot judge whether other users are authorized or not. However, the existing multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption schemes [9] , [11] , [12] , [14] - [16] , [18] , [20] , [21] , [23] , [25] mentioned above do not achieve the receiver anonymity and leak the receivers' privacy [32] more or less. Niu et al. [27] , [28] have taken the receivers' privacy protection into account during the course of designing their schemes. Nevertheless, analyses show that Niu et al.'s scheme [27] cannot truly achieve the receiver anonymity as they expected due to the inherent structure of Lagrange interpolation polynomial [33] . Although Niu et al.'s another scheme [28] achieves the receiver anonymity, it is still subjected to the key escrow problem resulted from the used IBC cryptography.
Through the above analyses, it can be seen that the research on the multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption scheme has become a new hotspot in the field of information security. However, the existing multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption schemes suffer from either the public key certificate management burden related with the PKI-based cryptography or the key escrow problem inherent in IBC, because they are constructed based on either the PKI-based cryptography or IBC. Moreover, some schemes are not ideal in efficiency, and some do not even protect the receivers' privacy. Motivated by these concerns, we introduce the concept of CLC-PKC into the designing of the multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption and propose an efficient and anonymous certificateless multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption scheme based on ECC. Our scheme is constructed based on CLC-PKC, and hence it is free from the public key certificate management burden and the key escrow problem. Besides, it is designed by utilizing the limited number of scalar point multiplication on ECC operations, which makes it efficient in computation. At the same time, it achieves the receiver anonymity and protects the receivers' privacy. Compared with the existing multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption schemes, our scheme has better performance in regardless of functions or efficiency.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the preliminaries are introduced in Section 2 and the proposed scheme is elaborated in Section 3. In Section 4, we prove the correctness and security of the proposed scheme. A comparison is made between the proposed scheme and the existing ones in terms of functions and efficiency in Section 5. Section 6 makes a summary of the full paper.
In order to facilitate understanding, notations used in this paper are listed in TABLE 1.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we will present computational problems, algorithm models and security models used in the proposed scheme.
A. COMPUTATIONAL PROBLEMS
Define that p is a large prime number, G p with its generator P is an addition cycle group of points on ECC, and Z * p is a non-zero multiplicative group. The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm problem (ECDLP) and Computational DiffieHellman problem (CDHP) are shown as follows:
1) ECDLP
With a set of given elements P, aP ∈ G p , calculating a is called the ECDLP, where a ∈ Z * p . Definition 1: The probability advantage that the ECDLP is solved in a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm is defined as
ECDLP Assumption: It is hard to solve the ECDLP in any PPT algorithm, and thus we assume that Adv ECDLP is negligible.
2) CDHP
With a set of given elements P, aP, bP ∈ G p , calculating abP is called the CDHP, where a, b ∈ Z * p . Definition 2: The probability advantage that the CDHP is solved in a PPT algorithm is defined as
. VOLUME 7, 2019 CDHP Assumption: It is hard to solve the CDHP in any PPT algorithm, and thus we assume that Adv CDHP is negligible. Set Public Key Algorithm: With the user's identity ID U , the user's secret value parameter D U , the user's partial public key T U and the public parameters params as input, the user executes the algorithm to generate his/her own public key PK U .
B. ALGORITHM MODELS
Set Private Key Algorithm: With the user's identity ID U , the user's secret value d U , the user's partial private key v U , the user's public key PK U and the public parameters params as input, the user executes the algorithm to generate his/her own private key SK U .
Signcryption Algorithm: With the sender's identity ID S , receivers' identities ID i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the plaintext message set M = {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n }, and the public parameters params as input, the sender executes the algorithm to generate the signcryption ciphertext σ .
Designcryption Algorithm: With the receiver' public key PK i , the signcryption ciphertext σ , and the public parameters params as input, the receiver executes the algorithm to generate his/her own plaintext message m i .
C. SECURITY MODELS
The security models of the proposed scheme are made up of message confidentiality, receiver anonymity and unforgeability. There are two types of attackers in every security model [29] . In the first two security models, two types of attackers are called the adversary A I and the adversary A II [30] , [34] respectively. In the third security model, two types of attackers are called the forger F I and the forger F II [34] , respectively. A I /F I can replace the user's public key arbitrarily but cannot get the system master key, while A II /F II knows the system master key but cannot replace the user's public key.
1) MESSAGE CONFIDENTIALITY
Message confidentiality refers to the fact that attackers within their own attacks have no ability to successfully decrypt out the plaintext message. Referring to the model of Selvi et al.'s scheme [34] , the message confidentiality model of the proposed scheme can be defined as the indistinguishability of certificateless multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption under selective multi-ID, chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CLMMRS-CCA). The following Game 1 and Game 2 are defined to meet IND-CLMMRS-CCA against A I and A II , respectively.
Game 1: The game is an interaction between the challenger C and the adversary A I under IND-CLMMRS-CCA. Define as a certificateless multi-message and multireceiver anonymous signcryption algorithm, and the specific game interaction is shown as follows:
Setup: C executes the algorithm to generate the system master key s and the public parameters params. Then, C sends params to A I and keeps s secret.
Phase 1: Receiving params from C, A I outputs n target identities L = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n }, and sends them to C.
Phase 2: A I asks C for a series of the following queries, and C makes according responds:
Set Secret Value Query: A I queries C for the secret value of the identity ID j . Receiving the query from A I , C runs the Set secret value algorithm to obtain the secret value d j , and returns it to A I .
Extract Partial Private Key Query: A I queries C for the partial private key of the identity ID j . Receiving the query from A I , C runs the Extract partial private key algorithm to obtain the partial private key v j , and returns it to A I .
Set Public Key Query: A I queries C for the public key of the identity ID j . Receiving the query from A I , C runs the Set public key algorithm to obtain the public key PK j , and returns it to A I . Set Private Key Query: A I queries C for the private key of the identity ID j . Receiving the query from A I , C runs the Set private key algorithm to obtain the private key SK j , and returns it to A I .
Public key replacement query: With the public key PK j , A I requests C for the public key replacement of the identity ID j . Receiving the request from A I , C replaces the public key PK j with PK j .
Signcryption query: With receivers' identities L * = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n } and the sender's identity ID S , A I queries C for the signcryption of the plaintext message set M = {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n }. Receiving the query from A I , C runs the Signcryption algorithm to obtain the signcryption ciphertext σ ←Signcryption(params, M , L * , ID S ), and returns it to A I .
Designcryption query: With receivers' identities L * = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n }, A I queries C for the designcryption of the signcryption ciphertext σ . Receiving the query from A I , C runs the Designcryption algorithmto obtain the plaintext message m i ←Designcryption(params, σ , L * ), and returns it to A I .
Challenge: A I chooses the sender's identity ID S , selects two plaintext message sets M 0 = {m 0 1 , m 0 2 , . . . , m 0 n } and
, and sends two plaintext message sets and the sender's identity ID S to C. Receiving {M 0 , M 1 , ID S } from A I , C randomly chooses a bit µ ∈ {0, 1}, calculates the signcryption ciphertext σ * ← Signcryption(params, M µ , L, ID S ), and returns σ * to A I .
Phase 3: A I asks C for the same queries as Phase 2. However, there are the following restrictions:
1) A I cannot query for the partial private key of any target identity in L.
2) A I cannot query for the private key of the target identity whose public key has been replaced.
3) A I cannot query for the designcryption of the signcryption ciphertext σ * .
Guess: According to the phases performed by A I and C above, A I outputs a bit µ ∈ {0, 1}. If µ = µ, A I wins the game. Otherwise, A I fails. The probability advantage that A I wins the game is
Definition 4: If for A I under IND-CLMMRS-CCA, its probability advantage of winning Game 1 meets
where ε is the non-negligible probability advantage.
Game 2: The game is an interaction between the challenger C and the adversary A II under IND-CLMMRS-CCA. Define as a certificateless multi-message and multireceiver anonymous signcryption algorithm, and the specific game interaction is shown as follows:
Setup: C executes the algorithm to generate the system master key s and the public parameters params. Then, C sends s and params to A II .
Phase 1: Receiving s and params from C, A II outputs n target identities L = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n } and sends them to C.
Phase 2: A II asks C for the same queries as Phase 2 in Game 1, and C makes according responds.
Challenge: A II chooses the sender's identity ID S , selects two plaintext message sets
, and sends two plaintext message sets and the sender's identity ID S to C. Receiving {M 0 , M 1 , ID S } from A II , C randomly chooses a bit µ ∈ {0, 1}, calculates the signcryption ciphertext σ * ← Signcryption(params, M µ , L, ID S ), and returns σ * to A II .
Phase 3: A II asks C for the same queries as Phase 2. However, there are the following restrictions:
1) A II cannot query for the secret value of any target identity in L.
2) A II cannot query for the private key of the target identity whose public key has been replaced.
3) A II cannot query for the designcryption of the signcryption ciphertext σ * .
Guess: According to the phases performed by A II and C above, A II outputs a bit µ ∈ {0, 1}. If µ = µ, A II wins the game. Otherwise, A II fails. The probability advantage that A II wins the game is
Definition 5:
If for A II under IND-CLMMRS-CCA, its probability advantage of winning Game 2 meets Adv IND−CLMMRS−CCA (A II ) ≤ ε within PPT t, the algorithm is said to meet (t, ε)-IND-CLMMRS-CCA-A II security, where ε is the non-negligible probability advantage.
2) RECEIVER ANONYMITY
Receiver anonymity refers to the fact that attackers within their own attacks have no ability to successfully obtain authorized receivers' identities. Referring to the model of Islam et al.'s scheme [30] , the receiver anonymity model of the proposed scheme can be defined as the anonymous indistinguishability of certificateless multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption under selective multi-ID, chosen ciphertext attack (ANON-IND-CLMMRS-CCA). The following Game 3 and Game 4 are defined to meet ANON-IND-CLMMRS-CCA against A I and A II , respectively.
Game 3:
The game is an interaction between the challenger C and the adversary A I under ANON-IND-CLMMRS-CCA. Define as a certificateless multi-message and multireceiver anonymous signcryption algorithm, and the specific game interaction is shown as follows:
Setup: The step is the same as Setup in Game 1. Phase 1: Receiving paramsfrom C, A I outputs two target identities L = {ID 0 , ID 1 } and sends them to C.
Phase 2: A I asks C for the same queries as Phase 2 in Game 1, and C makes according responds.
Challenge:
. . , ID n }, and the sender's identity ID S . Then, A I sends the plaintext message set M , receivers' identities L * and the sender's identity ID S to C. Receiving {M , ID S , L * } from A I , C randomly chooses a bit µ ∈ {0, 1}, calculates the signcryption ciphertext σ * ←Signcryption(params, M , ID µ , L * , ID S ), and returns σ * to A I .
Phase 3: The step is the same as Phase 3 in Game 1.
Guess: According to the phases performed by A I and C above, A I outputs a bit µ ∈ {0, 1}. If µ = µ, A I wins the game. Otherwise, A I fails. The probability advantage that A I wins the game is algorithm is said to meet (t, ε)-ANON-IND-CLMMRS-CCA-A I security, where ε is the non-negligible probability advantage.
Game 4: The game is an interaction between the challenger C and the adversary A II under ANON-IND-CLMMRS-CCA. Define as a certificateless multi-message and multi-receiver anonymous signcryption algorithm, and the specific game interaction is shown as follows:
Setup: The step is the same as Setup in Game 2. Phase 1: Receiving s and params from C, A II outputs two target identities L = {ID 0 , ID 1 } and sends them to C.
Phase 2: A II asks C for the same queries as Phase 2 in Game 2, and C makes according responds.
. . , ID n }, and the sender's identity ID S . Then, A II sends the plaintext message set M , receivers' identities L * and the sender's identity ID S to C. Receiving {M , ID S , L * } from A II , C randomly chooses a bit µ ∈ {0, 1}, calculates the signcryption ciphertext σ * ←Signcryption(params, M , ID µ , L * , ID S ), and returns σ * to A II .
Phase 3: The step is the same as Phase 3 in Game 2.
Definition 7:
If for A II under ANON-IND-CLMMRS-CCA, its probability advantage of winning Game 4 meets Adv ANON −IND−CLMMRS−CCA (A II ) ≤ ε within PPT t, the algorithm is said to meet (t, ε)-ANON-IND-CLMMRS-CCA-A II security, where ε is the non-negligible probability advantage.
3) UNFORGEABILITY
Unforgeability refers to the fact that attackers within their own attacks have no ability to successfully forge the sender's signature. Referring to the model of Selvi et al.'s scheme [34] , the unforgeability model of the proposed scheme can be defined as the strong existential unforgeability of certificateless multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption under selective multi-ID, chosen plaintext attack (SUF-CLMMRS-CPA). The following Game 5 and Game 6 are defined to meet SUF-CLMMRS-CPA against F I and F II , respectively.
Game 5: The game is an interaction between the challenger C and the forger F I under SUF-CLMMRS-CPA. Define as a certificateless multi-message and multireceiver anonymous signcryption algorithm, and the specific game interaction is shown as follows:
Setup: The step is the same as Setup in Game 1.
Phase 1:
Receiving params from C, F I outputs n target identities L = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n } and sends them to C.
Attack: F I asks C for the same queries as Phase 2 in Game 1, and C makes according responds.
Forgery: F I outputs the forged signcryption ciphertext σ * and a group of receivers' identities L * = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n }. If the signcryption ciphertext σ * can be decrypted and verified correctly by any receiver in L * , F I wins the game. Otherwise, F I fails. However, it is worth noting that σ * is not generated by Signcryption query, and other restrictions are the same as Phase 3 in Game 1.
Definition 8: If for F I under SUF-CLMMRS-CPA, its probability advantage of winning Game 5 meets Adv SUF−CLMMRS−CPA (F I ) ≤ ε within PPT t, the algorithm is said to meet (t, ε)-SUF-CLMMRS-CPA-F I security, where ε is the non-negligible probability advantage.
Game 6: The game is an interaction between the challenger C and the forger F II under SUF-CLMMRS-CPA. Define as a certificateless multi-message and multi-receiver anonymous signcryption algorithm, and the specific game interaction is shown as follows:
Setup: The step is the same as Setup in Game 2. Phase 1: Receiving s and params from C, F II outputs n target identities L = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n } and sends them to C.
Attack: F II asks C for the same queries as Phase 2 in Game 2, and C makes according responds.
Forgery: F II outputs the forged signcryption ciphertext σ * and a group of receivers' identities L * = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n }. If the signcryption ciphertext σ * can be decrypted and verified correctly by any receiver in L * , F II wins the game. Otherwise, F II fails. However, it is worth noting that σ * is not generated by Signcryption query, and other restrictions are the same as Phase 3 in Game 2.
Definition 9: If for F II under SUF-CLMMRS-CPA, its probability advantage of winning Game 6 meets Adv SUF−CLMMRS−CPA (F II ) ≤ ε within PPT t, the algorithm is said to meet (t, ε)-SUF-CLMMRS-CPA-F II security, where ε is the non-negligible probability advantage.
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
Participants of the proposed scheme consist of KGC, the sender S and receivers R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n . The specific scheme is made up of Setup algorithm, Extract key algorithm, Signcryption algorithm and Designcryption algorithm. The specific Extract key algorithm consists of Set secret value algorithm, Extract partial private key algorithm, Set public key algorithm and Set private key algorithm, shown as follows:
A. SETUP ALGORITHM KGC executes the algorithm to generate the system master key s and the public parameters params, shown as follows:
1) With the security parameter λ as input, KGC chooses a large prime number p, an elliptic curve E(F p ) on the finite field F p , an addition cyclic group G p on E(F p ), and one generator P of G p ;
2) Randomly choose s ∈ Z * p as the system master key, and compute P pub = sP as the system public key;
3) Choose a pair of secure symmetric encryption /decryption function E x /D x (for example AES), where x is the symmetric key; 4) Define five secure anti-collision hash functions: 4 }, and keep s secret.
B. EXTRACT KEY ALGORITHM
KGC and the user jointly execute the algorithm to generate the user's public key and private key, shown as follows:
The user randomly chooses an integer d i ∈ Z * p as his/her own secret value, and computes D i = d i P as his/her own secret value parameter, then sends ID i and D i to KGC through the public channel.
2) EXTRACT PARTIAL PRIVATE KEY ALGORITHM
Receiving ID i and D i from the user, KGC randomly chooses an integer t i ∈ Z * p , and computes the user's partial public key T i = t i P and partial private key v i = l i t i + s(modp), where
. Then, KGC sends v i to the user through the secure channel, and sends T i to the user through the public channel, respectively. 
C. SIGNCRYPTION ALGORITHM
With the sender's private key SK S , the public parameters params and the receivers' public keys {PK 1 , PK 2 , . . . , PK n } as input, the sender S signcrypts the plaintext message set M = {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n } as follows:
1) Randomly choose an integer r ∈ Z * p , and compute R = rP, K i = rH 1 (ID i , PK i )(PK i + P pub ) and
2) Randomly choose an integer θ ∈ Z * p , and compute
where (c 0 , c 1 , . . . , c n−1 ,  R, V , w, z) , every receiver R i uses his/her own private key SK i to designcrypt σ as follows:
, and check whether the equation z = z holds. If yes, the receiver R i continues with the following steps. Otherwise, the receiver R i rejects S , and exits the designcryption algorithm;
5) The receiver R i obtains the sender's public key PK S , and checks whether the equation wR = H 1 (ID S , PK S )(PK S + P pub ) holds. If yes, the receiver R i accepts the plaintext message m i . Otherwise, the receiver R i rejects the plaintext message m i , and exits the designcryption algorithm.
IV. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS AND SECURITY PROOFS
A. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS Theorem 1: The user's partial private key verification is correct in Extract key algorithm.
Proof: The correctness of the user's partial private key verification is guaranteed by the establishment of the equation
, and the deduction that the equation holds is shown as follows:
Through the above derivation, it can be seen that the equa-
As a result, the verification of the user's partial private key in Extract key algorithm is correct.
Theorem 2: The Designcryption algorithm is correct.
Proof: The correctness of Designcryption algorithm is guaranteed by establishments of equations z = z and wR = H 1 (ID S , PK S )(PK S + P pub ), and deductions that these two equations hold are shown in the following 1) and 2), respectively.
1) For every receiver R i , with the signcryption ciphertext σ , he/she has K i = (x i + y i )R and α i = H 0 (ID i , K i , R). Then, with α i , he/she can compute θ = ϕ(α i ), and then get β = H 3 (θ ) and S ||ID S = D β (V ). Finally, he/she has z = H 4 (S , θ, c 0 , c 1 , . . . , c n−1 , V , R, w) . Thus, the equation z = z holds.
2) When decrypting out the sender's identity ID S , the receiver can obtain the sender's public key and has
That is to say, the equation wR = H 1 (ID S , PK S )(PK S + P pub ) holds. Through the derivations of 1) and 2) above, it can be seen that equations z = z and wR = H 1 (ID S , PK S )(PK S + P pub ) hold. As a result, the Designcryption algorithm is correct.
B. SECURITY PROOFS
Based on security models in Section 2, we prove the security of the proposed scheme as follows: the message confidentiality is dependent on the establishment of the following Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, the receiver anonymity relies on the establishment of the following Theorem 5 and Theorem 6, and the unforgeability depends on the establishment of the following Theorem 7 and Theorem 8.
Theorem 3: IND-CLMMRS-CCA against the adversary A I . Under the random oracle model, if A I under IND-CLMMRS-CCA can win Game 1 with the nonnegligible probability advantage ε in PPT t (A I can ask for at most q i times H i queries, q sv times set secret value queries, q e times extract partial private key queries, q pk times set public key queries, q sk times set private key queries,q r times public key replacement queries, q s times signcryption queries and q us times designcryption queries.), the CDHP can be solved by the challenger C with the non-negligible probability advan-
2 n in the time t ≤ t + O(q pk + nq s + q us )t pm , where t pm is the time of a scalar point multiplication on ECC operation.
Proof: Assume that A I attacks IND-CLMMRS-CCA security of the proposed scheme, C is a CDHP challenger, and H 0 , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 and H 4 are hash functions defined under the random oracle model. With a set of given elements P, aP, bP , C hopes to solve the CDHP by interacting with A I . The specific interactions between A I and C are shown as follows:
Setup: C executes the algorithm to generate the system master key s = a ∈ Z * p and the public parameters params 
If yes, C returns l i to A I . Otherwise, C randomly chooses an integer l i ∈ Z * p , returns l i to A I , and stores the tuple
2) H 0 -query: With the tuple (ID i , K i , R) as input, A I queries C for H 0 hash value. Receiving the query from A I , C first checks whether there is a tuple (
If yes, C returns α i to A I . Otherwise, C randomly chooses an integer α i ∈ Z * p , returns α i to A I , and stores the tuple (ID i ,
3) H 1 -query: With the tuple (ID i , PK i ) as input, A I queries C for H 1 hash value. Receiving the query from A I , C first checks whether there is a tuple (
If yes, C returns ζ i to A I . Otherwise, C randomly chooses an integer ζ i ∈ Z * p , returns ζ i to A I , and stores the tuple (ID i , 
If yes, C returns z i to A I . Otherwise, C randomly chooses an integer z i ∈ Z * p , returns z i to A I , and stores the tuple (
Phase 2: A I asks C for a series of the following queries, and C makes according responds: 1) Key query: With ID i as input, C first checks whether there is a tuple ( 
2) Set secret value query: A I queries C for the secret value of the identity ID i . Receiving the query from A I , C first checks whether there is a tuple (ID i , d i , v 
, and sends two plaintext message sets and the sender's identity ID S to C. Receiving {M 0 , M 1 , ID S } from A I , C randomly chooses a bit µ ∈ {0, 1}, and calculates the signcryption ciphertext σ * as follows:
2) Choose α j ∈ Z * p , for j = 1, 2, . . . , n; 3) Choose θ ∈ Z * p and compute
, and return σ * to A I , whereQ j = l j T j + P sys , β = H 3 (θ ) and
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Phase 3: A I asks C for the same queries as Phase 2. However, there are the following restrictions: 1) A I cannot query for the partial private key of any target identity in L.
Guess: According to the phases performed by A I and the challenger C above, A I outputs a bit µ ∈ {0, 1}. If µ = µ, A I wins Game 1, and C outputs abP = R j -K j as a solution to the CDHP. Otherwise, C outputs ''failure''.
In the interaction process above, it is concluded that A I under IND-CLMMRS-CCA can ask for at most q i times H i queries, q sv times set secret value queries, q pk times set public key queries, q r times public key replacement queries, q s times signcryption queries and q us times designcryption queries. Therefore, the probability advantage that the CDHP can be solved by the challenger C in the time t ≤ t + O(q pk + nq s + q us )t pm is
where t pm is the time of a scalar point multiplication on ECC operation, ε is the non-negligible probability advantage, and t is the probability polynomial time. Theorem 4: IND-CLMMRS-CCA against the adversary A II . Under the random oracle model, if A II under IND-CLMMRS-CCA can win Game 2 with the non-negligible probability advantage ε in PPT t (A II can ask for at most q i times H i queries, q sv times set secret value queries, q e times extract partial private key queries, q pk times set public key queries, q sk times set private key queries, q r times public key replacement queries, q s times signcryption queries and q us times designcryption queries.), the CDHP can be solved by the challenger C with the probability advantage
Proof: Assume that A II attacks IND-CLMMRS-CCA security of the proposed scheme, C is a CDHP challenger, and H 0 , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 and H 4 are hash functions defined under the random oracle model. With a set of given elements P, aP, bP , C hopes to solve the CDHP by interacting with A II . The specific interactions between A II and C are shown as follows:
Setup: C executes the algorithm to generate the system master key s = β ∈ Z * p and the public parameters params (ID i , PK i ) . Then, C performs the following steps: a) If ID i = ID j , for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, C sets d i = ⊥ as the secret key, v i as the partial private key, SK i = (⊥, y i ) as the private key, and PK i as the public key. Then, C stores the tuple
. . , n}, C sets d i as the secret value, v i as the partial private key, SK i = (a-x i , y i ) as the private key, and PK i as the public key. Then, C stores the tuple
2) Set secret value query: A II queries C for the secret value of the identity ID i . Receiving the query from A II , C responds as follows: 
, and returns PK i to A II .
5) Set private key query:
A II queries C for the private key of the identity ID i . Receiving the query from A II , C responds as follows:
, and returns SK i to A II . 6) Public key replacement query: With the public keyPK i , A II requests C for the public key replacement of the identity ID i . Receiving the request from A II , C responds as follows: 
, and sends two plaintext message sets and the sender's identity ID S to C. Receiving {M 0 , M 1 , ID S } from A II , C randomly chooses a bit µ ∈ {0, 1}, and calculates the signcryption ciphertext σ * as follows:
, where Q j = l j T j + P sys and
2) Choose α j ∈ Z * p , for j = 1, 2, . . . , n; 3) Choose θ ∈ Z * p and compute 2) A II cannot query for the private key of the target identity whose public key has been replaced.
Guess: According to the phases performed by A II and the challenger C above, A II outputs a bit µ ∈ {0, 1}. If µ = µ, A II wins Game 2, and C outputs abP = R j + K j as a solution to the CDHP. Otherwise, C outputs ''failure''.
In the interaction process above, it is concluded that A II under IND-CLMMRS-CCA can ask for at most q i times H i queries, q e times extract partial private key queries, q pk times set public key queries, q s times signcryption queries and q us times designcryption queries. Therefore, the probability advantage that the CDHP can be solved by the challenger C in the time t ≤ t + O(q pk + nq s + q us )t pm is
2 n , where t pm is the time of a scalar point multiplication on ECC operation, ε is the non-negligible probability advantage, and t is the probability polynomial time.
Theorem 5: ANON-IND-CLMMRS-CCA against the adversary A I . Under the random oracle model, if A I under ANON-IND-CLMMRS-CCA can win Game 3 with the nonnegligible probability advantage ε in PPT t (A I can ask for at most q i times H i queries, q sv times set secret value queries, q e times extract partial private key queries, q pk times set public key queries, q sk times set private key queries, q r times public key replacement queries, q s times signcryption queries and q us times designcryption queries.), the CDHP can be solved by the challenger C with the probability advantage Proof: Assume that A I attacks ANON-IND-CLMMRS-CCA security of the proposed scheme, C is a CDHP challenger, and H 0 , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 and H 4 are hash functions defined under the random oracle model. With a set of given elements P, aP, bP , C hopes to solve the CDHP by interacting with A I . The specific interactions between A I and C are shown as follows:
Setup: The step is the same as Setup in Theorem 3. Phase 1: Receiving params from C, A I outputs two target identities L = {ID 0 , ID 1 } and sends them to C. Then, A I asks C for a series of the same H i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) queries as Phase 1 in Theorem 3, and the challenger C makes according responds.
Phase 2: A I asks C for the same queries as Phase 2 in Theorem 3, and C makes according responds.
Challenge: A I chooses a plaintext message set M = {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n }, a group of receivers' identities L * = {ID 2 , ID 3 , . . . , ID n }, and the sender's identity ID S . Then, A I sends the plaintext message set M , receivers' identities L * and the sender's identity ID S to C. Receiving {M , ID S , L * } from A I , C randomly chooses a bit µ ∈ {0, 1}, and calculates the signcryption ciphertext σ * as follows:
2) Choose α j ∈ Z * p , for j = µ, 2, 3, . . . , n; 3) Choose θ ∈ Z * p and compute
, and return σ * to A I , where
Phase 3: The step is the same as Phase 3 in Theorem 3.
Guess: According to the phases performed by A I and the challenger C above, A I outputs a bit µ ∈ {0, 1}. If µ = µ, A I wins Game 3, and C outputs abP = R j -K j as a solution to the CDHP. Otherwise, C outputs ''failure''.
In the interaction process above, it is concluded that A I under ANON-IND-CLMMRS-CCA can ask for at most q i times H i queries, q sv times set secret value queries, q pk times set public key queries, q r times public key replacement queries, q s times signcryption queries and q us times designcryption queries. Therefore, the probability advantage that the CDHP can be solved by the challenger C in the
where t pm is the time of a scalar point multiplication on ECC operation, ε is the non-negligible probability advantage, and t is the probability polynomial time. Theorem 6: ANON-IND-CLMMRS-CCA against the adversary A II . Under the random oracle model, if A II under ANON-IND-CLMMRS-CCA can win Game 4 with the nonnegligible probability advantage ε in PPT t (A II can ask for at most q i times H i queries, q sv times set secret value queries, q e times extract partial private key queries, q pk times set public key queries, q sk times set private key queries, q r times public key replacement queries,q s times signcryption queries and q us times designcryption queries.), the CDHP can be solved by the challenger C with the probability advantage Phase 2: A II asks C for the same queries as Phase 2 in Theorem 4, and C makes according responds.
Challenge: A II chooses a plaintext message set M = {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n }, a group of receivers' identities L * = {ID 2 , ID 3 , . . . , ID n } and the sender's identity ID S . Then, A II sends the plaintext message set M , receivers' identities L * and the sender's identity ID S to C. Receiving {M , ID S , L * } from A II , C randomly chooses a bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and calculates the signcryption ciphertext σ * as follows:
2) Choose α j ∈ Z * p , for j = µ, 2, 3, . . . , n; 3) Choose θ ∈ Z * p and compute , c 0 , c 1 , . . . , c n−1 , V , R j , w)), and return σ * to A II , where Q j = l j T j + P sys ,
Phase 3: The step is the same as Phase 3 in Theorem 4. Guess: According to the phases performed by A II and the challenger C above, A II outputs a bit µ ∈ {0, 1}. If µ = µ, A II wins Game 4, and C outputs abP = R j + K j as a solution to the CDHP. Otherwise, C outputs ''failure''.
In the interaction process above, it is concluded that A II under ANON-IND-CLMMRS-CCA can ask for at most q i times H i queries, q e times extract partial private key queries, q pk times set public key queries, q s times signcryption queries and q us times designcryption queries. Therefore, the probability advantage that the CDHP can be solved by the challenger C in the time t ≤ t + O(q pk + nq s + q us )t pm is ε ≥ ε 1 − q s (nq s + q H 0 ) 2 n 1 − q us 2 n , where t pm is the time of a scalar point multiplication on ECC operation, ε is the non-negligible probability advantage, and t is the probability polynomial time.
Theorem 7: SUF-CLMMRS-CPA against the forger F I . Under the random oracle model, if F I under SUF-CLMMRS-CPA can win Game 5 with the non-negligible probability advantage ε in PPT t (F I can ask for at most q i times H i queries, q sv times set secret value queries, q e times extract partial private key queries, q pk times set public key queries, q sk times set private key queries, q r times public key replacement queries, q s times signcryption queries and q us times designcryption queries.), the CDHP can be solved by the challenger C with the probability advantage ε ≥ Proof: Assume that F I attacks SUF-CLMMRS-CPA security of the proposed scheme, C is a CDHP challenger, and H 0 , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 and H 4 are hash functions defined under the random oracle model. With a set of given elements P, aP, bP , C hopes to solve the CDHP by interacting with I . The specific interactions between F I and C are shown as follows:
Setup: The step is the same as Setup in Theorem 3. Phase 1: Receiving params from C, F I outputs n target identities L = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n } and sends them to C. Then, F I asks C for a series of the same H i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) queries as Phase 1 in Theorem 3, and C makes according responds.
Attack: F I asks C for the same queries as Phase 2 in Theorem 3, and C makes according responds.
Forgery: F I outputs the forged signcryption ciphertext σ * and a group of receivers' identities L * = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n }. If equations z = z and wR = H 1 (ID S , PK S )(PK S + P pub ) hold, the forgery is successful. Then, setting K j = b(D j + l j T j ) and R j = b(Q j + D j ), C outputs abP = R j -K j as a solution to the CDHP, where Q j = l j T j + P sys . Otherwise, C outputs ''failure''.
In the interaction process, it is concluded that F I under SUF-CLMMRS-CPA can ask for at most q i times H i queries, q sv times set secret value queries, q pk times set public key queries, q r times public key replacement queries, q s times signcryption queries and q us times designcryption queries. Therefore, the probability advantage that the CDHP can be solved by the challenger C in the time t
Theorem 8: SUF-CLMMRS-CPA against the forger F II . Under the random oracle model, if F II under SUF-CLMMRS-CPA can win Game 6 with the non-negligible probability advantage ε in PPT t ( II can ask for at most q i times H i queries, q sv times set secret value queries, q e times extract partial private key queries, q pk times set public key queries, q sk times set private key queries, q r times public key replacement queries, q s times signcryption queries and q us times designcryption queries.), the CDHP can be solved by the challenger C with the probability advantage
Proof: Assume that F II attacks SUF-CLMMRS-CPA security of the proposed scheme, C is a CDHP challenger, and H 0 , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 and H 4 are hash functions defined under the random oracle model. With a set of given elements P, aP, bP , C hopes to solve the CDHP by interacting with II . The specific interactions between F II and C are shown as follows:
Setup: The step is the same as Setup in Theorem 4. Phase 1: Receiving s and params from C, F II outputs n target identities L = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n } and sends them to C. Then, F II asks C for a series of the same H i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) queries as Phase 1 in Theorem 3, and C makes according responds.
Attack: F II asks C for the same queries as Phase 2 in Theorem 4, and C makes according responds.
Forgery: F II outputs the forged signcryption ciphertext σ * and a group of receivers' identities L * = {ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n }. If equations z = z and wR = H 1 (ID S , PK S )(PK S + P pub ) hold, the forgery is successful. Then, setting K j = b(D j + Q j ) and R j = b(P 1 -D j -Q j ), C outputs abP = R j + K j as a solution to the CDHP, where Q j = l j T j + P sys and D j = P 1 -u j P. Otherwise, C outputs ''failure''.
In the interaction process, it is concluded that F II under SUF-CLMMRS-CPA can ask for at most q i times H i queries, q e times extract partial private key queries, q pk times set public key queries, q s times signcryption queries and q us times designcryption queries. Therefore, the probability advantage that the CDHP can be solved by the challenger C in the time t ≤ t + O(q pk + nq s + q us )t pm is
V. COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONS AND EFFICIENCY
Because schemes [12] , [15] , [20] , [21] , [23] , [25] , [28] , [30] - [32] have a higher similarity to the proposed scheme in functions or Cryptographic foundation, in order to show our scheme's advantages, we shall compare our scheme with them in terms of functions and efficiency in the following.
A. COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONS
We will compare schemes [12] , [15] , [20] , [21] , [23] , [25] , [28] , [30] - [32] with our proposed scheme in terms of functions, shown in TABLE 2.
From TABLE 2, we can see: (1) Schemes [12] , [15] , [20] , [21] , [23] , and [25] do not meet the receiver anonymity and the decryption fairness, which not only leads the receivers' identities information to be revealed, but also makes authorized receivers decrypt the signcryption ciphertext unfairly. Although schemes [28] and [31] satisfy the receiver anonymity, they do not meet the decryption fairness. (2) Schemes [12] , [15] , [20] , and [21] suffer from the public key certificate management burden because they are constructed based on the PKI-based cryptography, which causes huge expenses in maintaining PKI. Although there exists no the public key certificate management burden in schemes [23] and [28] , there exists the key escrow problem as a result of the use of IBC, which means that it is possible for schemes [23] and [28] to be attacked by malicious KGC. Because Wang et al.'s scheme [25] is a heterogeneous scheme, and it can shift between the PKI-based cryptography and IBC, there exist both the public key certificate management burden and the key escrow problem in Wang et al.'s scheme. (3) Although schemes [30] - [32] are free from the public key certificate management burden and the key escrow problem, and schemes [30] and [32] satisfy both the receiver anonymity and the decryption fairness, they cannot meet the requirements of the multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption scheme.
Through the analyses above, it can be seen that compared with schemes [12] , [15] , [20] , [21] , [23] , [25] , [28] , and [30] - [32] , the proposed scheme meets more functions shown in TABLE 2, and thus it is more practical for applications.
B. COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF EFFICIENCY
For the sake of convenient analyses, we first define some symbols to denote the computational complexity of different mathematical operations which are used in encryption/signcryption processes and decryption /designcryption processes, shown in TABLE 3 (The data are from [21] and [30] ). It is worth noting that only the mathematical operations in TABLE 3 are considered, because compared with those in TABLE 3, the computational time of other mathematical operations can be ignored.
The comparison results of computational complexity between the proposed scheme and schemes [12] , [15] , [20] , [21] , [23] , [25] , [28] , [30] - [32] are shown in TABLE 4 .
From TABLE 4, we can see that both in encryption/ signcryption processes and in decryption /designcryption processes, compared with schemes [15] , [23] , [25] , [28] , [31] , and [32] , the proposed scheme is low in computational complexity. Although the proposed scheme is slightly higher than schemes [12] , [20] , [21] , and [30] in computational complexity, which results from the newly added functions summarized in TABLE 2, we think that this deficiency is acceptable when considering the overall advantages of the proposed scheme. From a comprehensive perspective, compared with schemes [12] , [15] , [20] , [21] , [23] , [25] , [28] , and [30] - [32] , the proposed scheme is relatively high in efficiency.
VI. CONCLUSION
Aiming at the public key certificate management burden and the key escrow problem in the existing multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption schemes, we introduce the concept of CLC-PKC into the designing of the multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption and propose a certificateless multi-message and multi-receiver signcryption scheme. Compared with most existing multi-message and multireceiver signcryption schemes, the proposed scheme is free from the public key certificate management burden and the key escrow problem because it is constructed only based on CLC-PKC. Besides, it is improved in efficiency because the bilinear pairing operations are not used and the number of applied scalar point multiplication on ECC operations is limited as small as possible. At the same time, it achieves the receiver anonymity. The proposed scheme can be applied to ad-hoc networks to ensure that communication is efficient and secure and the receiver's privacy is protected. However, our scheme's security is proved under the random oracle model, which is not universal in reality more or less. Hence, we will do further research on security under the standard model to make the multi-message and multi-receiver scheme more practical. 
